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This study attempts to link the cost of debt to observed levels of accounting conservatism. Namely, 
conservative earnings reflect bad news more quickly than good news. Therefore, conservatism causes 
more timely recognition of losses than gains and improves quality of accounting information in 
context of corporate governance and loan agreements. Timely loss recognition increases efficiency of 
debt contracting and provides useful information to creditors. Further, conservative accounting limits 
the likelihood of inappropriate dividend payments and enables debt holders to use their control rights 
more quickly. Accordingly, lenders should reward companies that choose more conservative 
accounting with lower cost of debt. Level of conservatism is measured by asymmetric persistence of 
positive and negative earnings changes. Empirical evidence of the relation between conditional 
conservatism and debt cost is provided through the sample of listed companies from 17 Central and 
Eastern European countries in succession from 2003 to 2010, using panel data analysis. 
 






The aim of this paper is to examine the relation between companies’ conditional conservatism and the 
cost of debt. According to Basu (1997), conservatism can be defined as accountants’ tendency to 
require a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial 
statements. In accordance with principle of prudence, conservative accounting system recognizes 
potential decreases in income or assets well before they are realized, but postpones the recognition of 
income increase until it is realized or is sufficiently certain. Consequently, timely loss recognition and 
deferred gain recognition result in the lower persistence of earnings in bad news periods relative to 
good news period. Good news (gains) in earnings is more persistent because the capitalized value of 
good news is partially recognized in current earnings and partially is deferred in subsequent earnings. 





In contrast, more timely recognition implies transitory time-series components of earnings because all 
revisions in expected future cash flows are immediately included in current earnings. Accordingly, 
level of conservatism can be measured as asymmetric persistence of positive and negative earnings 
changes. 
Asymmetric timely recognition of losses relative to gains is often labeled as conditional conservatism, 
ex post conservatism or earnings conservatism. This paper focuses on conditional conservatism as it is 
considered to improve usefulness of accounting information, especially in the context of corporate 
governance and loan agreements. Namely, in accordance with postulates of positive accounting theory 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990), managers have incentive to increase level of reported earnings in order 
to maximize amount of their compensations. Conditional conservatism or timely loss recognition acts 
as an instrument of corporate governance in preventing management manipulations with reported 
earnings numbers. Kothari et al. (2009) point out three most important aspects of conservatism in 
reducing agency problems between shareholders and managers. First, as managers’ compensations are 
related with current performance, they are reluctant to report bad news. Conditional conservatism 
introduces obligation for the management to recognize bad news as it becomes available even if it does 
not meet the objectivity and verifiability thresholds that otherwise apply. Second, timely loss recognition 
mitigates agency problems associated with managers’ investments decisions. The ability to defer loss 
recognition provides managers an incentive to continue operating investments with negative net present 
values to avoid reported losses on sale or abandonment (Ball and Shivakumar; 2005). This agency 
problem is reduced by timely loss recognition. Third, by delaying bad news, managers could compensate 
themselves excessively, which implies significant cost for shareholders. On the other hand, application 
of timely loss recognition principle limits management overpayments. 
Primary focus of this research is to analyze the implications of conditional conservatism on loan 
agreements and consequently on cost of debt. It is often considered that debtholders demand 
conditional conservatism as a precondition to lending. Namely, timely loss recognition improves debt 
agreement efficiency by sending a more timely signal of default risk to debtholders and by allowing 
them to take protective actions. Zhang (2005) states that examples of protective actions include: 
accelerate the debt, reduce the borrowing base, enhance the security and adjust the interest rate to 
reflect the underlying risk. Besides, conditional conservatism also mitigates the potential risk of 
wealth transfer by reducing a likelihood of inappropriate dividend payments. Therefore, this paper 
assumes that lenders will offer lower interest rates to those borrowers who have more conservative 
financial reporting. 





This research contributes to the existing literature on conditional conservatism and debt cost by 
examining the benefits of conditional conservatism in bank-oriented code-law economies with inactive 
debt markets. So far, research in this area is mostly focused to market-oriented common law countries 
such as United States of America, Australia or United Kingdom. Moreover, no study was undertaken 
to examine the relation between debt cost and conservatism using asymmetric persistence of positive 
and negative earnings changes as a measure of conditional conservatism. Furthermore, in contrast to 
previous research this study uses panel data methods as they are more appropriate for cross-sectional 
time series structure of the data. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical background for the research and the 
review of the previous relevant literature. Section 3 describes the sample, data and research design. 
Section 4 presents the main empirical results and the conclusions appear in the last section. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Since Basu (1997) introduced the concept of earnings conservatism, it has become the subject of an 
active field of empirical research in accounting. There is a variety of different measures of 
conservatism in existing accounting literature. Wang (2010) summarized the most frequently used 
measures of conservatism: Basu’s (1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings measure; Ball and 
Shivakumar’s (2005) asymmetric-cash-flow-to-accruals measure; Penman and Zhang’s (2002) hidden 
reserves measure; Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) negative accruals measure; other measures (the Market-
to-Book ratio, earnings persistence measure, VAR based measure, skewness of earnings, etc.).  
Basu’s reverse earnings-return regression is currently the most frequently employed measure of 
accounting conservatism in the accounting literature and has the greatest impact on the literature 
(Wang, 2010). He proved that, because of the conservative bias in accounting, negative stock returns, 
which reflect downward adjustment in economic income, have a higher association with earnings than 
positive stock returns, i.e. upward adjustment in economic income. Therefore, under conservatism 
economic losses are reflected in earnings faster than economic gains. Basu also found evidence that 
conservative principles in accounting cause asymmetric persistence of positive and negative earnings 
changes. Namely, more persistence means that less current value relevant news is reported in current 
earnings and more of it will be reported in future earnings. Consequently, conservatism results in the 
lower persistence of earnings in bad news periods relative to good news periods (Basu, 1997). 
Many empirical studies have tried to quantify the extent of accounting conservatism and to identify the 
main benefits of conservatism. Watts (2003) concludes that existing evidence suggests how 





accounting conservatism is most consistent with contracting or litigation explanations and in less 
extent consistent with tax and regulatory explanations.  
Important stream of recent empirical studies tests whether conservatism is beneficial for debt 
contracting. These papers consider association between accounting conservatism and both the interest 
rate charged on the debt and the extent of debt in the capital structure. Thus, Ahmed et al. (2002) 
performed a research on the sample of US companies and proved that conservatism reduces the cost of 
debt, consistent to the debt-contracting hypothesis of conservatism. Zhang (2005) also conducted 
research on US companies and reported that conservatism benefits lenders because it accelerates debt 
covenant violations and provides a timely signal of default risk. Consequently, borrowers with more 
conservative accounting are rewarded with lower interest rates. Bauwhede (2007) examined 
differential impact of conditional and unconditional conservatism on company credit ratings using a 
large sample of American listed companies over the period 1999-2003. Results showed that credit 
ratings of companies in industries with more conditional conservatism are significantly more favorable 
and thus the costs of debt are lower. Li (2010) studied contracting benefits of accounting conservatism 
on international debt and equity markets. His results also proved that companies domiciled in 
countries with more conservative financial reporting systems have significantly lower cost of debt and 
equity capital. 
To summarize, it can be concluded that majority of conducted studies about association of conditional 
conservatism and debt cost are performed in common law countries such as US, United Kingdom or 
Australia. Moreover, Giner and Rees (2001) and Lara et al. (2005) state that level of conservatism is 
significantly different between code law and common law countries. Also, there are no studies that 
explore association between debt costs and asymmetric earnings persistence as measure of conditional 
conservatism. Most of previous literature uses measures of conservatism that are based on data from 
stock markets such as Basu’s earnings-returns reverse regression. As stock markets in Central and 
Eastern Europe countries are often inactive, market data can cause results to be biased. Further, 
Dietrich et al. (2007) argue that Basu’s reverse regression measure is biased and that studies 
employing asymmetric timeliness tests cannot be interpreted as providing evidence of conservatism. 
Thus, this study uses earnings persistence measure of accounting conservatism instead of frequently 
used reverse regression measure.  
 
3. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This section explains the sources of empirical data and estimation procedures in testing the association 
between level of conditional conservatism and debt costs. Conducted research is based on main 





assumption that companies with low level of conditional conservatism will have high debt costs. 
Empirical verification of working hypothesis is provided by using panel data analysis techniques.  
 
3.1. Sample selection 
 
Empirical research is conducted on the sample of public listed companies from 17 Central and Eastern 
European countries during the period from 2003 to 2010. Data set necessary for the research is collected 
from Amadeus database (Bureau van Dijk). Banks, investment funds and other financial institutions are 
not included in the sample. 
 
Table 1: Sample selection process 
Steps Criteria Number of companies
1. Legal status: Active companies 16,116,651
2. Legal form: Public 883,425
3. Region: Central and Eastern Europe 217,832
4. Listed companies 6,802
5. Category of companies by size: Very large & large companies 6,010  
Source: estimated according to data from Amadeus Bureau van Dijk (2012) 
 
 
Table 2: Sample structure by country 
Country Company-year observations

















Total 37,637  
Source: estimated according to data from Amadeus Bureau van Dijk (2012) 





The beginning sample consists of 16,116,651 active European companies in Amadeus data base. In the 
first step of sample selection process, we chose only the public companies, because the previous research 
(Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) found evidence of significant difference in level of conservatism between 
public and private companies. After that, we restricted our sample only to listed companies from Central 
and Eastern Europe. Final criterion in the sample selection was the company size. We included only the 
large and very large companies because a number of previous studies identified size of company as the 
important factor that affects level of conditional conservatism (e.g. Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Zhang, 
2005; Amort-Tapia et al., 2009; Ball et al., 2011; Khan and Watts, 2009). Complete sample selection 
process is presented in Table 1. 
The final sample consists of total of 6,010 companies or 37,637 company-year observations. Detail 
structure of selected sample by 17 Central and Eastern European countries is presented in the table 2.   
Selected companies are observed over the time period from 2003 to 2010 and distribution of 
observations by each year is show in the table 3 below.  
 










Total 37,637  
Source: estimated according to data from Amadeus Bureau van Dijk (2012) 
 
It can be seen from the table 3 that a number of selected companies is relatively equal over the 
observed time period with only exception of 2010. Also, there is a steady decrease in number of 
companies after 2007, probably caused by global financial crisis.  
 
3.2. Model specification  
 
To test the main hypothesis that companies with low level of conditional conservatism have high debt 
costs, this study extends Basu’s (1997) and Ball and Shiavakumar (2005) approach in measuring the 
level of conditional conservatism by asymmetric persistence of earnings changes. Namely, Basu 
(1997) argues that under conservative accounting, bad news is recognized in earnings immediately, 





contrary to good news. Consequently, it causes increase in earnings due to good news to be more 
persistent. Further, for companies with conservative accounting decrease in earnings in current period 
due to bad news is less persistent and more likely to reverse in future periods. So, negative correlation 
can be expected between decrease in earnings in the current and future periods. This asymmetric 
persistence of earnings changes is expressed in the following model (Basu, 1997): 
ΔNIt = β0 + β1*NEGt-1 + β2*ΔNIt-1 + β3*NEG t-1*ΔNIt-1 + εt   (1) 
Where ΔNIt is change in net income from year t-1 to t, scaled by beginning book value of total assets, 
ΔNIt-1 is change in net income from year t-2 to t-1, NEGt-1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 when ΔNIt-1 is negative and zero otherwise and εt is unobserved zero-mean error term. 
According to Ball and Shivakumar (2005), positive changes in net income are persistent and tend not 
to reverse, so the implication is β2 = 0. Also, application of conservative accounting causes income 
decreases to be transitory or to reverse, which implies β2 + β3 < 0. Finally, if economic losses are 
recognized in more timely manner than gains than it should be β3 < 0. 
This study extends the previous model by including debt cost variable, considering the examination of 
level of conditional conservative for companies with high debt costs. Thus, the following version of 
the model (1) is modified to allow differences between high debt cost companies and other companies: 
ΔNIit = β0 + β1*NEGit-1 + β2*ΔNIit-1 + β3*NEGit-1*ΔNIit-1 + β4*HDCit + β5*HDCit*NEGit-1 + 
β6*HDCit*ΔNIit-1 + β7*HDCit*NEG it-1*ΔNIit-1 + ai + εit     (2) 
where:  
ΔNIit is change in net income from year t-1 to t, scaled by beginning book value of total assets;  
ΔNIit-1 is change in net income from year t-2 to t-1;  
NEGit-1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when ΔNIt-1 is negative and zero otherwise;  
HDCit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if company’s debt cost1
ai is individual firm-specific effect which is assumed to be time invariant;  
 is higher than debt cost of 
75% observations in the sample and zero otherwise;  
εit is unobserved zero-mean error term.   
Predictions concerning the level of conditional conservatism for the whole sample are based on 
evidence from previous research (Basu, 1997; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Amor-Tapia et al., 2009). 
                                                 
1Debt cost is calculated as the ratio of company’s paid interest to interest-bearing debt (loans and long term debt from BvD 
Amadeus data base) similar to previous relevant research (e.g. Li, 2010).  





So, this study predicts persistent positive changes of accounting income (β2 = 0) and timelier 
recognition of economic losses than gains, i.e. transitory negative changes of net income (β3 < 0 and β2 
+ β3 < 0). Further, in accordance with stated hypothesis, it is expected that companies with high debt 
costs will have lower level of conditional conservatism. Companies with high debt costs are expected 
not to have timelier recognition of losses than gains and not to have transitory decreases of net income. 
The implication is β7 ≥ 0. No predictions are offered for differences in gain recognition between high 
debt cost companies and low debt cost companies (β6), nor for intercept and incremental intercept 
coefficients (β0, β1, β4, β5). 
Estimation of proposed model and verification of stated hypothesis is provided by using panel data 
analysis techniques. Most of the previous research on accounting conservatism employs ordinary least 
squares estimator and treats observations as being serially uncorrelated with homoscedastic errors for 
companies across time. Recent literature (Grambovas et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2011) emphasizes the 
importance of allowing for company heterogeneity in measuring accounting conservatism and the fact 
that panel methodology can provide more reliable estimates for dataset that contains company-year 
observations. Huang et al. (2011) point out that pooled OLS regression model ignores company 
heterogeneity which can cause an omitted variable bias in the parameter estimates of the regression 
model and thus lead to an inaccurate conclusion about the extent and trend in accounting 
conservatism.   
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This study adopts a panel-data methodology to estimate the relation between level of accounting 
conservatism and debt costs. Fixed-effects (FE) estimator, random-effects (RE) estimator and 
Arellano-Bond estimator are compared in order to identify the most appropriate panel method for the 
estimation of the research model. 
Estimated model with Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM estimator is considered inappropriate 
because results prove that dependent variable does not depend on its own past realizations. Performed 
postestimation specification tests (Sargan test and Arellano-Bond test) also indicate that dynamic panel 
model is not suitable. Finally, after estimation of FE and RE model, Hausman test is conducted in order 
to examine the appropriateness of a FE and RE models. The Hausman test compares two estimators 
assuming RE estimator is fully efficient under null hypothesis. Results from performed test (χ2=105.42; 
p=0.00) lead to strong rejection of the null hypothesis that RE provides consistent estimates and indicate 
that FE estimator is the more appropriate to use. Table 4 presents estimated results from FE model. 





Performed model uses robust standard error clustered by company to control for heteroskedasticy 
because the modified Wald test for heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model provided evidence 
on presence of heteroskedasticity (p=0.00).  
 
Table 4: Estimation results for fixed effect regression model 
ΔNIit = β0 + β1*NEGit-1 + β2*ΔNIit-1 + β3*NEGit-1*ΔNIit-1 + β4*HDCit + β5*HDCit*NEGit-1 + β6*HDCit*ΔNIit-1 + 
β7*HDCit*NEG it-1*ΔNIit-1 + ai + εit 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-stat p-value
Intercept (β0) ? -0.019*** -3.81 0.000
NEGt-1 (β1) ? 0.024* 1.67 0.095
ΔNIt-1 (β2) 0 0.000 1.12 0.263
NEGt-1*ΔNIt-1  (β3) < 0 -0.502*** -3.14 0.002
HDCt  (β4)  ? 0.019* 1.81 0.070
HDCt*NEGt-1 (β5)  ? -0.052** -2.52 0.012
HDCt*ΔNIt-1 (β6)  ? -0.300*** -4.00 0.000
HDCt*NEGt-1*ΔNIt-1 (β7)  ≥ 0 0.074 0.24 0.814
R-square (%) 2.10
Number of obs 11,210  
Notes:*statistically significant at the 0.1 level; ** at 0.05 level; ***at 0.01 level respectively 
Source: estimated according to data from Amadeus Bureau van Dijk (2012) 
 
The results from Table 4 report the existence of asymmetric persistence of positive and negative net 
income changes. There is a clear evidence of transitory loss but not gain components for all companies 
in the sample. The β2 coefficient on changes of net income from previous period is not significantly 
different from zero, as predicted. According to Ball and Shivakumar (2005) this indicates an absence 
of either continuation or reversal of income increases. Therefore, level of income is considered to be 
persistent because positive changes in income have no momentum. On the other hand, there is 
statistically significant negative coefficient β3 on negative changes of net income from previous 
period. Also, the sum of β2 and β3 is negative as expected (β2 + β3 = -0.502). Thus, it can be concluded 
that negative changes of net income are transitory or tend to reverse. Further, this suggests that 
economic losses are recognized in more timely manner than economic gains and can be seen as an 
evidence of accounting conservatism. 
Main research hypothesis expects that companies with high debt costs will have less conservative 
accounting. Namely, conservatism causes more timely recognition of losses than gains which improves 
the quality of accounting information in context of corporate governance and loan agreements. So, 
debtholders are likely to reward borrowers with more conservative accounting by reducing the interest 
rates (debt costs), and vice versa. Therefore, coefficients on changes of net income are expected to be 
substantially different for high debt cost companies than for the whole sample. Presented results show 





that coefficient β7 is not significantly different from zero. This means that decreases of net income are 
more persistent. Also, negative sign on β6 coefficient suggests that high cost companies have transitory 
income increases. Overall, these findings are consistent with hypothesis that higher debt cost is related 




This paper investigates the benefits from conditional conservatism for lenders and for borrowers in debt 
contracting process. It is assumed that debtholders will reward more conservative borrowers with lower 
interest rates and reduced debt costs. Namely, lenders prefer conservative accounting and timely loss 
recognition because it improves debt agreement efficiency by sending a more timely signal of default 
risk and allows them to take protective actions. Empirical findings in this paper prove that companies 
with higher debt cost have lower level of conditional conservatism, as it is expected in hypothesis. 
Contribution of this study to accounting literature can be found in several different aspects. First, to the 
best of our knowledge this is the first research that analyzes the relationship between debt costs and 
conditional conservatism measured by earnings persistence measure. Prior studies generally use market-
based measures of conditional conservatism. Also, research in this area is mostly limited to market-
oriented common law countries and this paper is focused on the sample of companies from code law 
bank-oriented countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, recent studies emphasize the 
importance of allowing for firm heterogeneity in measuring accounting conservatism. Therefore, this 
paper uses panel data analysis methodology as it is more appropriate for cross-sectional time series 
structure of the data. Results of this paper could be of interest not only to academics but also to standard 
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